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neers, economists and doctors, and too many lawyers. Such an outcome could be
avoided by introducing graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from
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11. Introduction
There is wide political consensus inside the European Union that decisions on public
education should be left to individual member states. Beneﬁts, however, accrue partly to
other member states through migration. As internationally applicable education generates
positive externalities to other member states, decentralized decision-making tends to lead
into ineﬃciently low investments in it. Increased mobility of the highly educated generates
incentives to scale back public ﬁnancing, recently exempliﬁed in the introduction of top-up
fees in England, and before that by Sweden replacing a system of income-contingent loans, in
eﬀect between 1989 and 2001, by ordinary annuity loans. (CSN 2002). Sweden abandoning
its income-contingent loan system may reﬂect the pressures of increased labor mobility; of
all of those who graduate from Swedish universities, 15 percent emigrate. (Eklund 1998).
Unlike income-contingent loans, annuity loans do not require cooperation from foreign tax
authorities. In the Netherlands, students in study programs targeted to international stu-
dents and typically taught in English are charged full tuition fees, while those in regular
programs are not. (Del Rey (2001)) The potential brain drain could have especially dire
consequences to the incentives that the new member states face in ﬁnancing their education
after the EU enlargement. Such a concern has so far been largely neglected at the expense
of the fear of negative consequences of "welfare tourism" to the current member states.
In this paper, I study the eﬀects of migration on the provision of country-speciﬁca n d
internationally applicable public education with two diﬀerent tax rules. The ﬁrst tax rule I
analyze is the current European tax constitution in which citizens pay taxes on their wages
2only to the country in which they live. With such tax rules, tax revenue from migrants
accrues fully to the country to which they have migrated. The alternative tax constitution
that I analyze has graduate taxes which are paid to the country which provided education
independently of future domicile. I use term graduate tax to denote a tax which is collected
from university graduates, without a requirement that tax revenue collected from them would
have to equal the costs of providing education. Such graduate taxes give the country which
educated migrants a stake also in their productivity gains earned elsewhere. I study both a
federation consisting of equally rich member states, corresponding roughly to the old member
states of the European Union, as well as a federation between a rich and a poor member
state, corresponding to old and new member states of the European Union after the Eastern
enlargement.1
At the same time as it distorts public investment in education, migration may encourage
private investments. Stark et al. (1997), Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and Wang (2002)
h a v es h o w nt h a te m i g r a t i o nm a yb e n e ﬁt also the source country, in contrast with earlier
brain drain literature, pioneered by Grubel and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada
(1974). Stark et al. (1997) show that when students invest privately in their human capital,
some migration from developing countries to developed countries may actually beneﬁtt h e
country of origin. The mechanism is as follows. A possibility to migrate into a richer
country increases the expected return to human capital investment in a poor country, thus
1I focus on education targeted to young adults. In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), parents valuing education
may buy better education for their children by paying higher taxes. Such a mechanism is much weaker in
higher education, as young adults may go to a university in a diﬀerent city, or even country, than in which
their parents pay taxes.
3encouraging private investment. Even with part of high-skilled workers migrating, this initial
brain gain may dominate, so that the less developed country can end up with a higher average
level of human capital per worker with migration than without it. The empirical analysis by
Beine et al. (2001) shows that such a beneﬁcial brain drain cannot be ruled out. Finally,
Stark and Wang (2002) show that a possibility of migration to a richer country may serve as
a substitute for subsidies for human capital formation, thus potentially beneﬁting also the
country of emigration. These contributions focus on private investment in human capital,
and they study the use of migration quotas by less developed countries. My focus is on
public provision of education, in the presence of complementary private investment. I also
assume that there are no legal restrictions to migration, consistent with the EU principles
of free mobility.
Previous literature has identiﬁed several ways through which migration with tax com-
petition may result in an ineﬃcient outcome. Justman and Thisse (1997) show that the
government that maximizes the utility of immobile residents simply reduces investment in
public education.2 Their model includes only one type of education. Another response
is taxing immobile tax bases to ﬁnance the education of high-skilled professionals, whose
tax burden would be eroded in international tax competition. This would imply regressive
redistribution, as shown by Wildasin (2000). It would also seem an unlikely outcome, in
2Kehoe, on the other hand, (1989) argues that tax competition may oﬀer a way to avoid the time-
consistency problem. Time-consistency problem tends to result in ineﬃciently low private investments as
taxpayers would anticipate that government may increase tax rates ex post. Andersson and Konrad (2003)
and Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) suggest that labor mobility could increase investment in education as it
serves as a commitment device to low taxation.
4case governments have to win political backing of the citizens staying. Poutvaara (2000,
2001) suggests ﬁnancing income redistribution for students from taxes collected from them,
independently of their future domicile. This would allow eﬃciency-improving income redis-
tribution to survive. This paper has a diﬀerent focus. Young people have diﬀerent abilities,
and there are several forms of human capital. Diﬀerent types of education are allowed to have
diﬀerent degrees of international applicability, and education is provided by the government.
Also Poutvaara (2004) studies public and private provision of diﬀerent types of education
with diﬀerent tax rules. This paper diﬀers in three respects. First of all, Poutvaara (2004)
assumes that human capital depends only on individual ability and investment in education,
while this paper allows human capital to depend also on private investment in eﬀort. Second,
Poutvaara (2004) models only a federation of symmetric member states, while this paper
models both a symmetric and an asymmetric federation. Third, Poutvaara (2004) allows for
externalities, while this paper derives its results in the absence of externalities.
My main result is that governments tend to reduce investment in internationally applica-
ble education when its applicability increases, even though such an increase would increase
complementary investment by students. A system of graduate taxes leads always into higher
welfare and more eﬃcient investment in internationally applicable education than the current
system, in which migrants pay all their taxes to their new home country. A less distributing
alternative to graduate taxes would be income-contingent loans. Insurance against low in-
comes could be provided by collecting repayments only from the income above a certain level
until the loan and the interest would be repaid. In return for the government absorbing the
5downside risk, a student would have to pay an insurance premium. This insurance premium
would be added to the debt, and could be a certain fraction of the balance borrowed. Already
Friedman and Kuznets (1945) suggested ﬁnancing professional education by students sell-
ing shares in their future earnings. Income-contingent loans would also allow diﬀerentiating
the prices charged for diﬀerent degrees. Financing for expensive degrees oﬀering relatively
low direct monetary returns but judged to be socially valuable, like arts and humanities,
would still call for subsidies from the general tax revenue or cross-subsidies from degrees
with relatively cheap production costs but high private returns, like law.
W i t hb e n e v o l e n tg o v e r n m e n t st h a tIa n a l y z ei nt h i sp a p e r ,t h e r ew o u l db en oe ﬃciency
justiﬁcation for a system of voluntary risk-sharing contracts between students and govern-
ments as opposed to compulsory system of graduate taxes, collected independently of domi-
cile. With voluntary contracts, a problem of adverse selection arises. Avoiding a break-down
of voluntary risk-sharing contracts could then require a partial subsidy from the general tax
revenue to those who participate.3 Most likely those with highest expected income would
still ﬁnd it optimal to purchase their education privately. Nonetheless, opting for voluntary
contracts on graduate taxes or income-contingent loans is still likely to be an optimal consti-
tutional arrangement in a federation, as opposed to binding nationality-based taxation. In a
world where benevolence of governments is not universally guaranteed, constitutional design
has to trade-oﬀ adverse selection problem and the need to tame Leviathan governments.
3Nerlove (1975) analyzes problems associated with ﬁnancing higher education using income-contingent
loans. Focusing on Yale Tuition Postponement Option, implemented in early 70s, he shows that the conse-
quences of income-contingent loans depended crucially on who participated.
6A voluntary system would maintain some degree of tax competition, viewed by Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) as an essential mechanism through which a federal structure protects
citizens against excessive taxation by lower-level governments. Accepting a certain degree of
adverse selection would then be optimal, and could be interpreted as a federation’s insurance
premium against potential abuses by governments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model of how the government
invests in education of its young citizens when the migrants pay their wage taxes only to their
country of domicile. This corresponds to the current European tax constitution. Section
3 studies investment behavior with graduate taxes, paid to the country which has ﬁnanced
education independently of future domicile. Results from sections 2 and 3 are more relevant
to current EU member states, as these sections study symmetric member states. Sections 2
also analyzes brain drain and brain gain in a federation of identical member states, with two-
way migration. Section 4 studies investment in diﬀerent types of education in an asymmetric
federation, focusing on incentives faced by the new member states after the enlargement of
the European Union. The results from section 4 allow comparisons with brain drain and
brain gain literature, which has focused on one-way migration from poorer to richer country.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Common Labor Market with Domicile-based Taxation
2.1. Game Structure
Without loss of generality, assume that there are two member states in a common labor
7market, labeled 1 and 2. I analyze a symmetric federation in which production functions,
wage tax rates and costs of education are the same in both member states, studying how
results would change in a federation of asymmetric member states in section 4.
In the ﬁrst stage, national governments invest in the education they provide to their
citizens. There are two types of education, labeled i and s. These subscripts refer to
whether the education is internationally applicable (i)o rc o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc( s). Only those
with internationally applicable education may migrate. In the second stage, students with
ability-intensive internationally applicable education invest privately eﬀort in their educa-
tion. Such investment cannot be veriﬁed by the government. In the third stage, those with
internationally applicable education choose in which member state they live and work. In
the fourth stage, citizens supply labor and pay taxes in the member state they live in. Gov-
ernment collects wage taxes from the educated to ﬁnance exogenous public consumption
and public education, and transfers the rest of the tax revenue to the rest of population,
like pensioners and the uneducated. In order to focus on the eﬀects of the mobility of labor
on investment in education, rather than the eﬀects of migration on tax rates through tax
competition, I assume that the tax rate of the educated is a constant t.4 Government budget
constraint is then balanced by adjusting transfers to the rest of the population. When educa-
tion is publicly provided, students would generally be better oﬀ accepting publicly provided
education, even if this does not maximize their gross income, than purchasing the other type
4Keen and Marchand (1997) use the same assumption when they study the eﬀect of ﬁscal competition on
the composition of public expenditure in the presence of mobile capital. They ﬁnd that in a non-cooperative
equilibrium, public expenditures are biased towards the provision of public inputs at the expense local public
goods beneﬁting immobile residents.
8of education themselves. From now on, I assume that it is optimal for all students to accept
publicly provided education rather than buying a diﬀerent education themselves. Without
loss of generality, I focus on analyzing member state 1.
2.2. Production
The production function is linear in the two types of human capital. Aggregate produc-







k, k ∈ {i,s}, is the post-migration stock of eﬀective human capital of type k,
as deﬁned in the following subsection. Labor markets are competitive, so that gross rates
of return to human capital of both types are equal to unity. Income diﬀerences then follow
from diﬀerent amounts of human capital.
Citizens diﬀer in their productivity in case they would complete education i, while they
have identical productivity in case they would complete education s. Human capital of type
i is a joint product of teaching and studying. For a citizen with ability a and individual
eﬀort e, individual human capital stock is before eventual migration
hi(a,e)=a + e. (1)
9Human capital with education of type s is for all individuals normalized to unity:
hs(a)=1 .
The monetarized cost of eﬀort e is βe2. This formulation of an increasing marginal
cost guarantees a bounded investment in e. The resource cost for universities of education
k,k ∈ {i,s}, is ck. This cost is borne by the government in case of public education. Ability
a follows a continuous distribution between 0 and a, with density function f(a). I assume
that a>1 and that parameter values are such that government always invests in both types
of human capital.
2.3. Migration
As h a r eγ of internationally applicable education in one member state is applicable in
the other member state in case of migration, satisfying 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.I n o r d e r t o a c c o u n t
for a possibility of mutually beneﬁcial brain exchange, assume that each individual faces
an individual-speciﬁc random component related to productivity abroad, unknown to gov-
ernment and individual before investment in education but known to the individual before
migration. The random component takes a multiplicative form 1+ε,s ot h a tε is uniformly
distributed between −0.5 and 0.5. Some individuals would then lose an individual-speciﬁc
share of their productivity in case they emigrate, while others would beneﬁtf r o mab o o s t
in their productivity abroad. An individual with internationally applicable education would
10then emigrate to the other member state if and only if
γ(1 + ε) > 1. (2)
(2) deﬁnes the cutoﬀ level of εi = 1
γ − 1, below which citizens with internationally
applicable education remain in their original member state. By symmetry, this cutoﬀ level
is the same in both member states. For simplicity, I assume that ε is not correlated with
individual ability a. By this assumption and the properties of uniform distribution, the share
of remaining internationally applicable human capital is given by F(εi).
W h e nt h e r ei ss o m em i g r a t i o n ,F(εi)=1
γ − 1
2 i st h es h a r eo ft h o s ew i t he d u c a t i o ni who








As long as γ>2
3, there is migration. The probability of migration reaches its peak of 0.5
when γ =1 . As migration occurs only when the productivity of migrants is higher in the
other member state, brain exchange increases the aggregate production. Thanks to mutually
beneﬁcial brain exchange, the average productivity of migrants with education i is b times
what it would have been if they would have stayed in their member state of origin, in which








This average gain is the same for migrants from both member states.
2.4. Education with Domicile-based Taxation
By (1), (3) and (4), a student of ability a chooses with education of type i private eﬀort
e to maximize
(1 − p)(1 − t)(a + e)+p(1 − t)b(a + e) − βe
2,
resulting in optimal eﬀort choice
e =
(1 − t)(1 − p + pb)
2β
.
With eﬀective human capital being separable in private ability and eﬀort, students of all









5With ε being uniformly distributed between −0.5 and 0.5, the highest value of 1+ε is 3
2, while the
lowest value with migration is 1+ε1
i = 1
γ.
6Separability of eﬀort and ability allows also to derive results in the special case β →∞ , resulting in
students not investing privately in eﬀort, and all human capital being determined solely by the type of
education and ability. If ability and eﬀort would be multiplicative, then most able students would also invest
most in eﬀort.
12I assume that the government is able to screen the students with highest ability to
participate in ability-intensive education i. I ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lt od os o ,a sp r o d u c t i v i t y
with country-speciﬁc education does not depend on ability. I denote the cutoﬀ level of ability
chosen by government j,j ∈ {1,2}, by b aj, below which citizens are educated in the ﬁeld s
a n da b o v ew h i c hi nt h eﬁeld i. Thus, the stock of human capital s in member state 1 is
H
1
s = F(b a1),






f(a)ada +[ 1− F(b aj)]
(1 − t)(1 − p + pb)
2β
.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reports that part of education i which depends
on individual ability, and the second term is that part that is determined by individual
eﬀort. Post-migration internationally applicable human capital in member state 1 consists
of share (1−p) of domestically created human capital and human capital of those who have
immigrated from member state 2:
H
1
i =( 1− p) e H
1
i + pb e H
2
i .
Government in each member state collects wage taxes at rate t from the educated to
ﬁnance exogenous public consumption G and public education, and returns the rest of the
13tax revenue to the owners of the other factors of production, like the uneducated. The





i )=G + csF(b a1)+ci(1 − F(b a1)) + T1. (6)
The left-hand side gives wage tax revenue from the educated, while the right-hand side
reports the expenditures, budget being balanced by endogenous T1. Utility of the educated
and of the recipients of transfers is linear in their consumption. I assume that the government
sets equal weight to the consumption of the educated who stay and to the consumption of
the recipients of lump-sum transfers, but that the government does not care about the eﬀort
costs of students with internationally applicable education. There are two alternative ways
to interpret this. One is that the government maximizes the gross domestic product available
for consumption, net of costs of education. Another interpretation is that eﬀort spent by
students on studying generates positive externalities. Therefore, it is not pure waste from
social perspective. In case these externalities would equal private costs, these terms would
cancel out for a utilitarian government. To avoid having to include any externalities in
the production function, I adopt the interpretation that the government simply maximizes
production. A crucial question when analyzing publicly provided education with migration
is to determine how each government appreciates the utility of those of its citizens who
emigrate.7 I assume that the weight on those citizens is α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This formulation has
7There is no need to specify how the government values the utility of immigrants, as immigrants have
already received education from the other country when they arrive.
14two polar cases: with α =0e a c hg o v e r n m e n tc a r e so n l yf o ri t sc i t i z e n sw h od on o te m i g r a t e ,
and with α =1the emigrants count with the same weight as citizens who stay. The social
welfare function of the government of member state 1 is
SWF1 =( 1− t)H
1
s +( 1− p)(1 − t) e H
1
i + αp(1 − t)b e H
1
i + T1.
The ﬁrst two terms give the after-tax income of the educated who stay, the third term
is the social valuation of the utility of the educated who emigrate, the fourth term is the
lump-sum transfer for the rest of the population. The social welfare function consists of
two components, those determined by the own policy variable b a1 and those determined by
b a2. The latter part, namely tpb e H2
s, measures positive ﬁscal externalities in the form of
tax revenue, arising from the education provided in the other member state. With such a
decomposition and inserting (6), social welfare function reads as
SWF1 = H
1
s +[ 1− p + αpb(1 − t)] e H
1
i + tpb e H
2
i − csF(b a1) − ci(1 − F(b a1)).
Noticing that immigrated human capital is independent of domestic education policy, the
ﬁrst-order condition of domestic policy for member state 1 is given by
1 − cs =[ 1− p + αpb(1 − t)]
·







The left-hand side gives the social surplus from providing education s,a n dt h er i g h t - h a n d




1 − cs + ci
1 − p + αpb(1 − t)
−
(1 − p + pb)(1 − t)
2β
. (7)
Comparative statics yield that investment in education i is increasing in cs and α and
decreasing in ci and β.O n l yw h e nγ>2/3, there is migration. If γ ≤ 2/3, p =0and (7)
would simplify to b aDT
1 =1− cs + ci − (1 − t)/(2β). Assume from now on that γ>2/3.
















8 )(1 − t)
2β
. (8)
Whether public investment in internationally applicable education is larger with or with-
out migration, depends to a large extent on tax rates and on the social valuation of income
accruing to emigrants. If tax rates are very high, then social valuation of the after-tax income
of emigrants is low, and governments reduce investment in internationally applicable edu-
cation when the probability of migration increases. Even in the presence of complementary
private eﬀort, it always holds:
Proposition 1 Governments with α =0always reduce investment in internationally ap-
plicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in international applicability of human capital encourages private investment
16in it. Recent work on the economics of the brain drain, most notably Stark et al. (1997)
and Stark and Wang (2002), show that a positive probability of migration encourages private
investments in human capital. Given that private and public investments are complementary,
this would leave the eﬀect of an increased international applicability of education i on public
investment in it a priori unclear. On one hand, brain drain eﬀect would push the government
to reduce public investment in it, while brain gain eﬀect would render investing in it more
attractive. Remarkably, I ﬁnd that brain gain eﬀe c ta l w a y sd o m i n a t e sa sc o n c e r n sp u b l i c
investment, provided that the government cares only about its citizens staying. Due to the
presence of brain gain eﬀect, however, aggregate stock of internationally applicable human
capital may either increase or decrease when its international applicability increases:
Proposition 2 When education is provided by governments with α =0 , an increase in the
applicability of internationally applicable education may result in either larger or smaller
pre-migration stock of it.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 suggests that in addition to the cost of private eﬀort, β, also ability distri-
bution plays an important role in determining, whether an increase in international applica-
bility of the internationally applicable human capital increases or decreases its formation.
The intuition is as follows. If the density of abilities around the marginal ability to be given
internationally applicable education is very low, then the negative eﬀect at the extensive
margin from reduced public provision is small, and positive eﬀect from increased private
eﬀort at the intensive margin dominates. If, on the other hand, density of abilities around
17b aj(γ) is high, then an increase in minimum ability above which the government provides
internationally applicable education excludes a large number of students, and the extensive
margin may dominate.
Importantly, an increased mobility of labor need not always reduce total resources used
to ﬁnance education. Whether this is the case or not depends on which type of education
is more expensive. Also when internationally applicable education is less expensive, an
increased probability of migration reduces individual government’s incentives to invest in it.
When government attaches the same weight on emigrants as on citizens staying, in-
creased mobility may lead to either larger or smaller investment in internationally applicable
education. On the one hand, eﬃciency gains from brain exchange for emigrants encour-
age governments to invest more in the internationally applicable education. On the other
hand, governments are pushed towards less investment because they lose tax revenue from
emigrants.
Proposition 3 G o v e r n m e n t sw i t has u ﬃciently high α may increase investment in interna-
tionally applicable education when its applicability increases, provided that t is not too high.
Ceteris paribus, a decrease in β widens scope for the government to increase investment in
i when γ increases.
Proof. To prove existence, set t =0 , cs = ci,a n dα =1in (8). Then diﬀerentiating
it yields ∂b aDT
1 /∂γ > 0 by γ ≥ 2/3. Without restrictions on the value of t, cs,o rci,
∂2b aDT
1 /∂γ∂β > 0 in (8).
18The latter ﬁnding relates to results by Stark et al. (1997) and Stark et al. (2002):
a positive probability of migration encourages private investments in human capital. My
results arise in a common labor market of two symmetric countries. Previous literature on
brain drain and brain gain has focused on migration from a less developed country to a more
developed country. (See Stark et al. 1997, Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and Wang (2002)
I nm ym o d e l ,p r i v a t ei n v e s t m e n ti st h em o r ei m p o r t a n tt h es m a l l e rβ is. In case β
becomes prohibitively large, students only receive human capital depending on their ability.
This would eliminate the beneﬁcial incentive eﬀect from increased expected rate of return
on human capital abroad to increased private investment in eﬀort. However, even when β
is prohibitively large, an increased probability of emigration may encourage governments
valuing the utility of emigrants highly to increase investment in internationally applicable
education. This requires that the expatriates earn a higher net wage abroad than their
gross wage domestically. The government would also have to be willing to tax the remaining
population to ﬁnance the utility gains of expatriates. This is not likely if the government has
to win approval from the remaining population. Therefore, it seems more likely that increased
labor mobility would induce the government to change the mix of education provided towards
those ﬁelds that beneﬁt the remaining population, even when the government values the
utility of emigrants.
3. Federation with Graduate Taxes
Assume next that emigrants pay graduate taxes to the government which initially edu-
cated them. The net present value of graduate tax payments depends on future income ﬂow.
19While there could be an exempted income below which the graduate tax is not collected, I
f o c u so nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hag r a d u a t et a xi sa ne qual share of income for all educated. The
graduate tax rate in both member states is tg. The general wage tax rate with graduate
taxes is tw, so that tw = t − tg. As the aggregate tax rate is the same as in an economy
with only domicile-based taxation, migration rules derived in section 2.3 still apply. Also
individual eﬀort invested in education i is the same as with only domicile-based taxation. I
also assume that graduate tax revenue is added into and public education ﬁnanced out of
general tax revenue, instead of assuming a separate budget run to ﬁnance education out of
graduate tax revenue. This formulation allows government to still subsidize part of public
education out of general tax revenue. Such subsidization might be needed to alleviate the
adverse selection problem when students are allowed to opt out of graduate taxes and ﬁnance
their education directly themselves.
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Member state 1 has post-migration stock of internationally applicable human capital
H
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and a stock H1GT
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There are two diﬀerences compared to equilibrium with only domicile-based taxes. First
of all, each member state now receives graduate taxes also from emigrants. Secondly, they
can levy only the ordinary wage tax rate tw on immigrants. Citizens still face tax rate
t = tw + tg in both member states. The government of member state 1 maximizes
SWF
GT
1 =( 1− t)H
1GT
s +( 1− p)(1 − t) e H
1GT






1 from the government budget constraint and notice that immigrated




1 − cs + ci
1 − p + αpb(1 − t)+tgpb
−
(1 − p + pb)(1 − t)
2β
. (9)
Graduate taxes always encourage more investment in internationally applicable educa-
tion:
Proposition 4 Governments invest more in internationally applicable education with grad-
uate taxes than with only domicile-based taxation. Investment in internationally applicable
education is increasing in the graduate tax rate.
Proof. The nominator of the ﬁr s tt e r m so f( 7 )a n d( 9 )i st h es a m e ,w h i l et h ed e n o m i n a t o r
21in the latter one exceeds that in the ﬁrst one by tgpb. The second term is the same. When
tg > 0, b aGT
1 < b a1. Furthermore, ∂b aGT
1 /∂tg < 0.
Notice that this result is independent of the weight assigned to emigrants, and of the
relative importance of private investment in eﬀort. Whether governments invest more or less
in internationally applicable education with graduate taxes than without migration again
depends on the conﬂicting eﬀects: eﬃciency gains of brain exchange encourages such invest-
ments, while the incentives of keeping wage tax revenues in the home country discourages
them.
A central result is then:
Proposition 5 Allowing member states to levy graduate taxes is welfare improving.
Proof. See Appendix.
While I have so far assumed member states to be identical, graduate taxes are actually the
more desirable as opposed to complete harmonization the more member states would diﬀer.
A system with national graduate taxes would respect the subsidiarity principle. Member
states could adopt diﬀerent degrees of public participation in education. Depending on
political preferences, member states could opt for a compulsory graduate tax with wider
income redistribution, or, alternatively, for voluntary contracts in which students would
have to commit to paying a graduate tax in the future in exchange for public ﬁnancing of
education, or opt out and pay their education themselves.
The implementation of graduate taxes (or income-contingent loans) requires that all
member states of the federation collect tax revenue or loan repayment also for the other
22member states. This would call for a creation of a European tax payer identity number, as
well as exchanging information between member states. A European tax payer identiﬁcation
number could be constructed from existing national social security numbers by adding a
country code in front of them, and deciding that the social security number received at birth
with its initial country code would serve as the European tax payer identiﬁcation number
also in case of changing nationality.
4. Asymmetric Federation
Assume next that a federation consists of two asymmetric states. Member state 1 is as
earlier, while productivity in member state 2 diﬀers from that in state 1 by coeﬃcient x,






Assume that also the government’s costs of providing education are a multiplicative x
of those in state 1. This captures the stylized fact that as a signiﬁcant part of the costs
of providing education are wage costs, an increase in the general level of productivity also
causes an increase in the cost of providing education. To capture the gap in living standards,
migration can go in only one direction, from member state 2 to member state 1. Wage tax
rate is the same t in both member states. A citizen then migrates from member state 2 if
23γ(1+ε) >x .T h i sa l l o w st os o l v ea st h es h a r eo fh u m a nc a p i t a li not migrating from state 2







giving as the probability of emigration from state 2







To guarantee that there is some migration but that not everyone with education i migrates
from member state 2, I assume that 3γ−2x>0 and 2x−γ>0, implying that 2x
3 <γ<2x.









A student receiving education i in member state 2 would then choose eﬀort e to maximize
(1 − p2)(1 − t)x(a + e2)+p2(1 − t)m(a + e2) − βe
2
2,









8The highest productivity of one unit of pre-migration human capital from member state 2 in member
state 1 is 1.5γ,a n dt h el o w e s tx.
24Comparing (5) and (12) yields that investment in eﬀort by students receiving education
i in member state 2 is increasing in x and in γ. Parallel to the analysis of a symmetric
federation,
Proposition 6 Government of member state 2 with α =0always reduces investment in
internationally applicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that even as brain gain from the possibility of migration inten-
siﬁes, government of the poorer member state still reduces its investment in internationally
applicable human capital, as its applicability increases. Interestingly,
Proposition 7 An increased probability of emigration from member state 2 to member state
1, resulting from an increase in γ or a decrease in x, may either increase or decrease welfare
in member state 1 with only domicile-based taxation.
Proof. See Appendix.
To summarize, the welfare eﬀects of international applicability may be non-monotonic.
Also the member state beneﬁting from immigration may be hurt if its attractiveness increases
too much, relative to the other member state. The reason why an increase in the mobility of
labor from poorer to richer member state may decrease welfare in the richer member state
hinges on the policy response of the government in the poorer member state. If a further
increase in the probability of emigration results in the government of the poorer member
25s t a t et os w i t c ht oo ﬀering country-speciﬁc education, the richer member state suﬀers also as
it no longer receives immigrants and the tax revenue they would oﬀer. Finally,
Proposition 8 Member state 2 invests more in internationally applicable education with
graduate taxes than under only domicile-based taxation.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the insight of Proposition 5 holds also in an asymmetric federation. By Propo-
sition 8, the introduction of graduate taxes in the new member states could oﬀer a triple
dividend, beneﬁting the emigrants, those left behind in the new member states and the old
member states alike.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I show that decentralized decision-making on public education encourages
the member states of the European Union to distort the provision of public education away
from internationally applicable education, towards country-speciﬁc skills. If governments
focus on the utility of those citizens (and voters) who stay, then they reduce the provision
of internationally applicable education even when students would increase complementary
private investment in eﬀort. My analysis thus suggests that the brain drain eﬀect would
dominate brain gain, at the extensive margin of government deciding to how many students
it provides internationally applicable education. At the intensive margin of students deciding
on their complementary private investment in eﬀort, an increase in international applicability
results in more eﬀort. The net eﬀect can then go in either way. Brain gain eﬀe c ti sm o r el i k e l y
26to dominate when the density of students around the cutoﬀ level of ability above which the
government provides internationally applicable education is low. The higher such density,
and the more expensive private eﬀo r ti s ,t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st h a tt h en e g a t i v ee ﬀe c ta tt h e
extensive margin exceeds the positive eﬀect at the intensive margin.
Whether the behavioral responses at the intensive margin by students or at the extensive
margin by governments dominate, behavioral responses at the extensive margin lead into
ineﬃciently low number of students receiving internationally applicable education. As a
remedy, I suggest introducing graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, paid according to
the same rules independently of future domicile. Giving member states a stake in eﬃciency
gains also earned elsewhere would encourage governments to invest more in human capital
beneﬁting also the other member states. The enlargement of the European Union increases
potential beneﬁts of establishing graduate tax contracts or income-contingent loans. With
current tax rules, incentives of citizens and those of governments would diverge. Students
would ﬁnd incentives to study for migration, thanks to higher expected earnings elsewhere.
Governments, on the other hand, would face incentives to educate students to stay, by oﬀering
them too little internationally applicable human capital, and too many country-speciﬁc skills.
A system of graduate taxes or income-contingent loans should be based on voluntary
contracts, in order to protect citizens against the possibility of excessive taxation by rent-
seeking governments. Even though some students would opt out, this would not threaten
the system. By paying their own education, those opting out would not impose any burden
on those signing the contract. Voluntary contracts would also enjoy a greater legitimacy
27than subjecting citizens, even in case of permanent emigration, to an inescapable tax burden
on the basis of where they were born. Rather than replacing market mechanism, voluntary
contracts would supplement it. In both new and old member states, graduate taxes or
income-contingent loans would also replace current eﬃciency-reducing incentives to restrict
inﬂow of students from other states, identiﬁed by Del Rey (2001), by eﬃciency-improving
incentives to provide internationally applicable education, capable also of attracting students
from other member states. Thus, such a reform would favor the emergence of a genuine and
competitive European market for higher education.
Appendix.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
















The ﬁrst term is positive, and the second negative. Notice that when both types of education
are provided, social surplus from providing education s has to exceed that from providing
education i with a =0 .T h a ti s ,1 − cs > (1 − p)e − ci. By (3) and (5), this implies that














28The right-hand side of (A1) is positive if





















4 > 0. This condition always holds as γ ≤ 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
It is useful to write the stock of internationally applicable human capital explicitly as a
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T h el a s tl i n eu s e s( 8 ) . T h eﬁrst term is negative as ∂b aj(γ)/∂γ > 0 by Proposition 1.
The second term is positive by γ>2/3.I ff(b aj(γ)) → 0,t h eﬁrst term vanishes. Then the
second term dominates, and ∂ e H
j
i/∂γ > 0.I fβ →∞ ,t h e n∂ e H
j
i/∂γ = b aj(γ)[∂b aj(γ)/∂γ] < 0
by Proposition 1.
29P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
Welfare eﬀects of education policy of either member state can be divided into internalized
eﬀects and externalities on the other member state. By Proposition 4, b aGT
1 < b aDT
1 (and
b aGT
2 < b aDT
2 ). By revealed preferences, internalized social welfare has to be at least as high
with b aGT
1 as member state 1 could still have chosen b aDT
1 but did not, and similarly for member
state 2. As internationally applicable education also creates positive ﬁscal externalities in
the other member state, both member states create larger positive externalities on the other
member state, at the same time as they achieve at least as large internalized social welfare.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .














Government budget constraint is
t(xH
2
s + x(1 − p2) e H
2
i )=G2 + xcsF(b a2)+xci [1 − F(b a2)] + T2,
and social welfare function is
SWF2 =( 1− t)xH
2
s +( 1− p2)(1 − t)x e H
2
i + αp2m(1 − t) e H
2
i + T2.
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Notice that when both types of education are provided, social surplus from providing
education s has to exceed that from providing education i with a =0 .T h a ti s ,x − xcs >
(1 − p2)e2 − xci. By (10) and (12), this implies that














The right-hand side of (A4) is positive if

























































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .
Assume ﬁrst that the probability of migration is zero. Then an increase clearly beneﬁts
the other member state as it receives tax revenue from immigrants. If, however, the proba-
bility of migration increases to one and α is suﬃciently low, then the government of member
state 2 stops investment in internationally applicable education. Thus, an increase in the γ
(or a decrease in x) improves welfare in the member state 1 when migration is suﬃciently
small, but reduces welfare in member state 1 when migration is suﬃciently large.
32P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8





(1 − cs + ci)x
(1 − p2)x + αp2m(1 − t)+tgp2m(1 − t)
−




2 and b aGT
2 in diﬀer by an additional positive term tgp2m(1 −t) in the denominator of
b aGT
2 , implying a lower cutoﬀ level of ability.
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